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The January 1991 collapse of the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity 
Corporation (RISDIC) was the last in a series of two-decades-long collapses of  state- 
chartered, privately operated deposit insurance funds for thrift institutions.  This paper 
analyzes the collapse of RISDIC with a view toward distinguishing the elements of failure 
it shared with the 1985 collapses of the Ohio and Maryland funds. 
It took Rhode Island officials nearly three years to return the full amount of 
principal to depositors at five RISDIC-insured credit unions, and about two-thirds of  all 
RISDIC-insured deposits were frozen for the greater part of a year.  However, the state 
lobbied successfully for a $180 million federal loan guarantee for a bond issue, with the 
proceeds used to provide liquidity to frozen RISDIC-insured deposits.  Moreover, during 
1993, a final charge of $31.9 million was used for defeasance of  the remaining liability for 
the federally guaranteed bond issue. 
The Rhode Island solution was more protracted than in Ohio, where a "cold 
turkey"/no federal assistance approach was followed, but was less protracted than in 
Maryland, which minimized federal involvement but used withdrawal limitations to avoid 
the immediate pain of a total closing of the affected privately insured institutions. 
Although Rhode Island taxpayers still confront a RISDIC-derived insurance fund shortfall 
in excess of $350 million (mid-1993 estimate), they have the capacity to achieve an 
entirely state-funded solution over the long term, a praiseworthy accomplishment for a 
state with only 1 million people. 
The Rhode Island fund and the other state funds studied suffered from common 
defects that have plagued private deposit insurance schemes in the past, such as 
dominance of the legislature by the private fund and incapacity of the fund's supervisors to 
rein in the risk-taking activities of the largest insured institutions.  The existence of  these 
defects in the examples studied does not necessarily mean that all private deposit insurance 
funds are doomed to fail.  However, it probably does mean that private deposit insurers 
have to exercise greater vigilance than in the past if future RISDIC-like failures are to be 
avoided. 
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The January 1991 collapse of the Rhode Island Share and Deposit Indemnity 
Corporation (RISDIC) was the last in a series of post-1970 failures of state-chartered, privately 
operated deposit insurance funds for thrift institutions, industrial banks, and some credit 
unions.  The failures began in Mississippi in 1976 and continued in Nebraska and California 
(1983), Ohio and Maryland (1985), Utah and Colorado (1987), and Rhode Island (1991).  By 
February 1989, even the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation's (FSLIC) authority 
to accept new conservatorships or receiverships was effectively suspended.  The Resolution 
Trust Corporation was created the following August to administer the resolution of insolvent 
thrifts whose deposits were FSLIC insured, and the FSLIC was abolished (Kane [1992]; U.S. 
House of Representatives [1985]). 
This paper analyzes the collapse of RISDIC with a view toward distinguishing the 
elements of failure that it shared with other large state-chartered deposit insurance funds -- 
principally the Ohio and Maryland funds -- from those that were unique to Rhode Island.  The 
principal factor separating the solutions that state and federal officials decided upon in Rhode 
Island from the solutions used in Ohio and Maryland were a congressional field hearing in 
Rhode Island and a federal loan guarantee for part of the bonds issued by  the Depositors 
Economic Protection Corporation (DEPCO).  DEPCO is the state-chartered entity whose bond 
issues funded the liquidations of the remaining RISDIC-insured  institutions and provided some 
liquidity to the frozen claims of depositors in RISDIC-insured institutions (U.S. House of 
Representatives [1991]).  Federal Reserve Banks ' discount window advances, which were a 
principal source of depositors' liquidity in Maryland and, to a small degree, in Ohio, were not 
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advances in Rhode Island if an appropriate occasion arose (Preston [1986]; Syron [1991]). 
Despite the comparative success of Rhode Island in providing a fair measure of relief 
over time for claimants whose RISDIC-insured deposits were frozen, problems remain. 
Nearly three years passed after the RISDIC-insured institutions were closed before depositors 
at five of them received full reimbursement of their principal on October 15, 1993, as did 
depositors of another institution engaged in a court-supervised self-liquidation who wished to 
obtain the DEPCO-funded return of their funds.  Besides providing liquidity for those six 
institutions, DEPCO still is administering at least a small part of the assets remaining from six 
additional institutions sold or merged into federally insured depositories with DEPCO 
assistance (McCarthy [1994]).  After setting aside $31.9 million for complete defeasance of 
the $180 million federally guaranteed bond issue of 1991 during fiscal year 1993, DEPCO's 
current unfunded deficit has been reduced to about $356 million as of June 30, 1993, a huge 
burden in a state with a population of only 1 million and with pre-crisis operating budgets of 
about $1.5 billion per year (DEPCO [1993]).  An alternative suggestion for resolution of the 
crisis is presented in the conclusion of this paper, and the appendix to the paper analyzes the 
sources and uses of funds for RISDIC's 1j.quidation. 
11.  Background 
Federal deposit insurance did not exist until 1933 (see Flood [1992]), but several states 
introduced private deposit insurance schemes in the early part of this century.  By  1933, 
however, all the state plans had failed (Wheelock and Wilson [1994]; Todd and O'Driscoll 
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private deposit guaranty association law, covering building and loan and savings and loan 
associations (S&Ls), in 1955, and Maryland enacted its private deposit insurance law for S&Ls 
in 1962.  RISDIC was chartered in 1969 and commenced business in 1971 with 40 member 
credit unions and insured share accounts of $134 million.' 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a secular rise in interest rates adversely affected 
the profitability of many thrift institutions, and their loan and investment powers were 
expanded without a proportionate increase in the accuracy of accounting rules or in effective 
supervision. These factors eventually brought to light net worth crises in both the federal and 
state-chartered thrift institution deposit insurance systems (Kane [1989; 19921).  Such 
problems, sometimes exacerbated by fraud, first overwhelmed the smaller state-chartered 
deposit insurance funds (Mississippi, Nebraska, and a small California fund for "thrifts and 
loans"), and then affected the largest state-chartered funds (Ohio and Maryland) by  1985.  The 
FSLIC itself is now generally recognized to have been effectively insolvent on a market-value 
accounting basis by  1980, even though that insolvency was not publicly acknowledged by the 
responsible officials until the late 1980s  .' 
Officials in charge of most of the remaining large state-chartered private deposit 
insurance funds took steps after the Maryland collapse in May  1985 to prevent similar 
problems in their states.  In Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, for example, 
the comparable deposit insurance funds generally urged their members who could qualify to 
apply for federal deposit insurance as soon as possible.  They  remained in business only as 
backup insurers for deposits in excess of the $100,000 federal limit (the Massachusetts model) 
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than $5 million of total deposits)(see Kane [1992]). 
Rhode Island officials, on the other hand, deliberately chose to defy the disturbing 
signs from Ohio and Maryland and even raised RISDIC's insured deposit limit to $500,000 
(with unlimited coverage on certain accounts) in late 1985.  Despite explicit warnings from the 
Rhode Island attorney general and a bill filed in the legislature in 1986 to require federal 
deposit insurance for qualifying RISDIC institutions, no plan for the orderly winding up of 
RISDIC's affairs was implemented.  The 1986 bill failed and was not reintroduced in later 
years (Pulkkinen and Rosengren [1993]; Gregorian [I99  11). 
Also, adverse trends regarding the solvency of the largest RISDIC member, Marquette 
Credit Union (closed in 1991), were noted in the outside auditor's report on RISDIC as early 
as 1981.  Marquette had $339 million of total assets at book value when it was closed in 
January 1991 and held about one-fifth of all deposits insured by RISDIC.3 When the outside 
auditors began to qualify their financial reports, RISDIC changed audit firms and received 
"clean" opinion letters (qualified only in footnotes to the financial statements) through 1988.4 
However, the emergence of problems at specific institutions could easily have escaped the 
notice of RISDIC's board of directors, who apparently did not review examiners' reports and 
who had no audit committee analyzing the work of RISDIC's outside audit firm (Gregorian 
[1991]).  The RISDIC board shared one significant trait with the failed Maryland insurance 
fund:  A large majority (15) of its members were representatives of the insured institutions, 
and only three directors were appointed to represent the public interest.  In Maryland, the 
insured institutions appointed eight of the 11 directors (ibid. and Preston [1986]). 
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institutions and may have used their legislative influence both to fend off reform proposals like 
the 1986 bill to require federal deposit insurance and to help RISDIC stall for time as its rate 
of  collapse accelerated during 1990.5 The chairman of the Rhode Island Credit Union League, 
which operated as a trade association for the state-chartered credit unions, also served as vice 
chairman of the State Assembly's committee with jurisdiction over credit unions, and the 
committee's chairman served as an officer in one of the three largest RISDIC-insured credit 
unions.  The effects of this politicization are summarized as follows in the conclusion of the 
report of the governor's special study commission on the collapse of RISDIC: 
Collectively and individually, RISDIC staff and directors lacked insurance experience, 
had little banking experience outside of the small world of Rhode Island state-chartered 
financial institutions, and possessed modest educational and professional credentials. 
Nevertheless, they were well compensated and had great confidence in each other's 
talents and integrity.  RISDIC directors seemed generally oblivious to the complex 
risks for which they were responsible.  Examination findings and problems noted at 
member institutions were filtered out or excused as they were communicated upward 
within RISDIC.  The result was an uninformed board.  (Gregorian [1991]) 
In. A Chronology of the Events Leading to RISDIC's Demise 
The precipitating factors in RISDIC's collapse were two failures of insured institutions 
during 1990 that essentially depleted the funds available to RISDIC and precipitated'  runs on 
other insured institutions in November and December of that year.  Those runs prompted 
Governor Sundlun to order all RISDIC-insured institutions closed as his first significant act 
upon assuming office on January 1, 1991.  At the end of February 1990, Jefferson Loan and 
Investment Bank (not a credit union) was discovered to have borrowed its capital from another 
financial institution in violation of state regulations, to have recorded equipment lease income 
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RISDIC took control of Jefferson and reserved $3.9 million to cover Jefferson's losses, but did 
not propose a new assessment of RISDIC's member institutions then (Gregorian [1991]). 
The second failure that precipitated the end of RISDIC was attributed to loan 
defalcations at Heritage Loan and Investment Company (also not a credit union) discovered 
during the third quarter of  1990.  The loan losses caused RISDIC to infuse $17.5 million into 
Heritage in October and November 1990 and to assess RISDIC member institutions a further 
$5.5 million to maintain RISDIC's reserve level.  The president of Heritage also was a 
director of RISDIC.  On November 8, 1990, he disappeared (two years later, he reappeared, 
was arrested, tried, convicted, and currently is in prison).  News of his disappearance caused a 
public run on Heritage, and the state's Treasurer and some other RISDIC-insured institutions 
also withdrew their deposits (ibid. and Ingrassia and Wilke [1991]). 
Runs on other institutions accelerated after the closing of Heritage on November  16. 
The Rhode Island Central Credit Union was particularly hard hit during December 1990, 
apparently borrowing $20 million from the Rhode Island Credit Union League-Corporate 
Central Union (RICUL-CCU) to fund the runs.  During the weekend of December 29-30, 
RICUL-CCU essentially took over Rhode Island Central's premises and assets to secure its 
loans.  On December 3 1, apparently urged to do so by the National Credit Union 
Administration (NCUA), RICUL-CCU refused to extend any more credit to Rhode Island 
Central to cover the checks it was issuing for withdrawals.  NCUA officials argued correctly 
that further loans to Rhode Island Central from RICUL-CCU, which had both federally 
insured and RISDIC-insured members, might mean that deposits of the federally insured 
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Central.  Also, on December 3  1, 1990, RISDIC's board met, decided against a second 
assessment of members, and asked that a conservator be appointed to take over RISDIC's 
affairs (Gregorian [I99  11). 
IV.  Common Factors in the Downfall of the Three State Funds 
The private deposit insurance funds in Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island had some 
common characteristics that led in various degrees to their ultimate collapses.  All were 
dominated by the regulated industry (state-chartered S&Ls in Ohio and Maryland and credit 
unions in Rhode Island), and all seemed to have considerable influence in their state 
legislatures regarding the expansion of their lending and investment powers (as distinguished 
from the lesser restraining influence of the relevant state supervisory and regulatory bodies). 
The problems of the largest insured institutions were identified in supervisory 
examinations or outside audits years before the final collapses of the insurance funds in each 
state.  However, for a variety of reasons -- summarized in one account as a lack of necessary 
supervisory "clout" -- ineffective corrective actions or, as in Ohio, virtually no corrective 
actions at all were taken.6 
The state political authorities in each case initially attempted to deny the magnitude of 
the insurance fund's problem once the insolvencies of the insured institutions posing the largest 
risks to the fund were revealed.  They used devices like 1) the self-evidently deficient 
capitalization of the successor fund in Ohio (Kane [1992]), 2) the appointment of conservators 
instead of receivers in all three states once the largest insolvent insured institutions and the 
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(see Todd and O'Driscoll [1993]), and  3) strategies based on the groundless assumption that 
the FSLIC (Ohio and Maryland) or the National Credit Union Administration (Rhode Island) 
would take the worst cases off their hands without substantial injections of state funds.7 
The primary common element among the collapses of the three funds was their 
incapacity to exercise sufficient supervisory authority to limit risks or to impose effective risk- 
based deposit insurance premiums to make unwise risk-taking more costly for the insured 
institutions creating the largest risks.  In the absence of effective restraints on risk-taking, and 
without adequate insurance reserves or assurance of replenishment following recognition of 
loss, any large loss was bound to undermine public confidence and to trigger rational runs by 
depositors on other institutions insured by the same fund if the solvency of those other 
institutions was also questionable.  In each of the three states, the political authorities waited 
until runs had spread to several other institutions insured by the same fund before closing all 
the privately insured firms or imposing limitations on  withdrawal^.^ 
V.  RISDIC's Collapse Distinguished from Those in Ohio and Maryland 
Some factors, however, clearly separate the collapse of RISDIC from the Ohio and 
Maryland failures.  The principal economic factor behind the failure of RISDIC-insured 
institutions was real estate loan and investment losses in New England, which were particularly 
severe between 1989 and 1992 (Randall [1993]; Syron [1991]), while the failures of the 
privately insured institutions in Ohio and Maryland causing the largest losses were attributable 
to imprudent involvement with fraudulent government securities dealemg Real estate loan and 
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Home State, the largest failed S&L. 
While geographic concentration of lending and investment risks generally exacerbates 
the tendency of depository institutions to fail during regional economic downturns, the extreme 
degree of geographic concentration in Rhode Island, combined with the particular nature of the 
primary loan and investment risk of the RISDIC-insured institutions (real estate), made the 
proportional loss from book value during the regional downturn much greater, on a fundwide 
basis, than actually occurred in Ohio and Maryland (Syron [1991]).  Fund losses did not 
exceed 10 percent of insured deposits in Ohio and Maryland, but in Rhode Island, that share 
approached one-third.  Also, while the state-chartered S&Ls and building and loan associations 
in Ohio and Maryland had many economic characteristics in common with the state-chartered 
credit unions and industrial banks in Rhode Island, the legal and institutional structures of 
credit unions and industrial banks are so different from the structures of traditional housing 
lenders as to warrant a somewhat different analysis.1° 
The greatest dissimilarities between the Rhode Island crisis and those in the other two 
states were in the solutions that state authorities actually achieved:  There was a congressional 
field hearing in Warwick, Rhode Island, in May  1991, five months after the RISDIC-insured 
institutions were closed and while state authorities were still trying to develop a funding 
vehicle for frozen claims.  Neither Ohio nor Maryland achieved such a field hearing, but there 
was a congressional hearing on the Ohio crisis in Washington, D.C. about one month 
afterward, which also was about one month before the governor declared an emergency in 
Maryland (U.S. House of Representatives [1985]; ibid. [1991]).  Also, while both Ohio and 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmMaryland officials requested federal financial assistance to resolve their deposit insurance fund 
problems, only Rhode Island received such direct assistance (a federal loan guarantee), almost 
certainly a result of the congressional field hearing.ll 
In each of the three states, the private deposit insurance fund had become fairly large 
before the final crisis struck:  Ohio had $4.2 billion of insured deposits in 70 institutions, with 
$130 million available to the insurance fund; Maryland had $7.2 billion of insured deposits in 
102 institutions, with $175 million available to the insurance fund; and Rhode Island had $1.8 
billion of insured deposits in 46 institutions as of September 30, 1990, the last calendar quarter 
before Governor Sundlun closed the 45 remaining institutions, with $25 million available to 
the insurance fund (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [1985]; Gregorian [199:1.]).  In Rhode 
Island, the comparative importance of the RISDIC problem was somewhat more pronounced 
than in the other two states because RISDIC insured 357,000 individual accounts, about one 
for every three persons in Rhode Island.'' 
Some notable differences emerged in the failure resolution techniques used by state and 
some federal officials in the three states studied.  In Ohio, the governor proclaimed an 
emergency bank holiday that required all institutions insured by the failed private fund to close 
until they were either assured of receiving federal deposit insurance or sold or merged into a 
federally insured institution.  The remaining institutions, except for Home State, the largest 
and most profoundly insolvent firm, were allowed to reopen under the supervision of the 
state's Division of Savings and Loans on a limited-withdrawals basis, in most cases not more 
than $750 per account per month (later increased to $1,000).  While d  depositors of 
institutions insured by the failed fund were denied access to their funds during the emergency 
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after March 21 enabled depositors at 59 of  the 68 remaining firms to gain at least partial access 
to their money by  March 25.  Because the Ohio institutions held a fairly high proportion of 
assets of good quality, the liquidity problems of  all but a few were minimal:  The peak amount 
of  Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland discount window advances to those institutions was only 
$45 million during the reserves maintenance week ending March 27, 1985, less than 2 percent 
of all non-Home State deposits insured by the private fund.  The State of Ohio committed $151 
million of nontax revenues (e.g., liquor monopoly and lottery surpluses) to support bonds 
issued to fund the reopenings, and full access to deposits was restored at all but one small 
institution ($59 million of  deposits) by  January 3, 1986.  Depositors of all but three institutions 
received full availability of  funds within six months after the March closings (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland [1985]). 
In Maryland, queues of depositors seeking to withdraw their money from Old Court 
Savings and Loan, the largest severely impacted privately insured institution (nearly $1 billion 
of total assets), were shown on television newscasts on May 9, 1985, and such visible runs 
then spread to other privately insured institutions, especially Merritt Commercial Savings and 
Loan Association.  The $200 million estimated loss at Old Court alone exceeded the $175 
million available in the Maryland private insurance fund.  By  May  13, conservators were 
appointed for both Old Court and Merritt, and on May  14, Governor Hughes proclaimed a 
state of emergency that limited withdrawals from all privately insured S&Ls to $1,000 per 
account per month.  Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond advances to the Maryland institutions 
were much larger and of longer duration than in Ohio.  The Maryland institutions had 
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million by April 18.  Maryland advances lingered on the books of  the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Richmond:  The last borrowings were not repaid until 1989.  Several large institutions, 
including Old Court, Merritt, and Community Savings and Loan, had all their deposits frozen 
for several months.  By January 1986, more than $1.15 billion of Maryland deposits were still 
frozen, not even available for partial withdrawals. 
The eventual solution involved a combination of state-sponsored bond issues and a 
continuation of withdrawal limitations at Old Court and Community to provide a full return of 
principal over five years:  Some Maryland depositors were not repaid in full until 1989. 
However, apparently at the urging of senior Federal Reserve officials, state authorities decided 
to avoid a complete closing of all privately insured institutions, totally froze the claims of 
depositors at only three institutions, committed sufficient state-sponsored bond revenues to 
cover all insured deposits over five years, and avoided "haircuts,  " or partial final payouts to 
depositors (Preston [1986]; Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland [1985]).  The Maryland 
solution differed substantially from the Ohio and Rhode Island solutions because of the 
protraction in the full return of  insured deposits, the far greater reliance on and continuation of 
Federal Reserve liquidity assistance, and the avoidance of  a complete closing of all privately 
insured institutions. 
In Rhode Island, depositors obtained the full return of their principal far less quickly 
than in Ohio but far more quickly than in Maryland, and there was no actual use of  Federal 
Reserve liquidity assistance.  However, Rhode Island obtained and made use of  a federal loan 
guarantee for its state-sponsored bond issues aimed at resolving the crisis, which did not occur 
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institutions completely closed, which had the effect of freezing all deposits until the affected 
firms were sold, merged, or liquidated.  Fortunately, from the depositors' viewpoint, there 
were no involuntary haircuts or discounted returns of their deposit principal.  Unfortunately, 
from the taxpayers' viewpoint, the depositors' potential losses in Rhode Island were distributed 
over a pool of taxpayer households that was roughly identical to the pool of depositor 
households.  In Ohio and Maryland, depositors' losses could be distributed over larger 
population sets because depositor households represented a minority of taxpayer households. 
Therefore, it was unlikely that Rhode Island's chosen solution was politically feasible without 
the federal government bearing the residual risk of loss via the $180 million federal loan 
guarantee for the 1991 series A DEPCO bond issue. 
VI.  Conclusion 
It took nearly three years after the closing of the RISDIC-insured institutions for 
depositors at six of them to be able to obtain the full return of their principal.  Rhode Island 
succeeded in obtaining a federal loan guarantee for the rescue effort where Ohio and Maryland 
failed, but even the $180 million of federally guaranteed bonds filled only about one-third of 
the hole in RISDIC's net worth that federal authorities expected when the liquidations began in 
199  1 (U. S . House of Representatives [1991]).  And it appears that a remaining gap of about 
$356 million still has to be filled.  The principal comparatively painless means of closing that 
gap are receipts from liquidations, revenues from performing loans in DEPCO's asset 
portfolio, and the anticipated proceeds of litigation against RISDIC's auditors and some 
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funds available to DEPCO are the dedicated portion of a special state sales tax currently 
generating about $38 million per year, of which about one-half must be set aside for debt 
service on outstanding bonds.  All of these amounts are quite large for a state economy the size 
of Rhode Island's. 
Prompt liquidation and sale of insolvent RISDIC-insured institutions with no guarantee 
of full recovery to depositors, even allowing for the federal loan guarantee of $180 million, 
would have saved Rhode Island taxpayers as much as $356 million at present value (the 
remaining unfunded DEPCO deficit) and still would have enabled DEPCO to distribute about 
70 cents per dollar of insured deposits to depositors.  This alternative would have been 
politically difficult, to be sure, because the collapse of RISDIC in early January 1991 
coincided with the failure of the Bank of New England and initially affected nearly every 
household in Rhode Island.  The involvement of prominent Rhode Island politicians in 
RISDIC's affairs prior to its collapse also made it difficult for those politicians to appear to 
walk away from the crisis.  Also, contagious bank runs apparently did occur:  The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston reported that it made 30 emergency shipments of currency to Rhode 
Island and southeastern Massachusetts in January 1991 alone (Syron [I99  I]).  It turned out that 
the records and accounting systems of several of the largest failed RISDIC-insured institutions 
were so poor that it required several months to determine the expected loss for each and that a 
prompt liquidation and sale would have been nearly impossible.  Thus, although deposits of 
those institutions would have remained frozen for several months -- they remained frozen for 
several months anyway under the solution actually pursued.  Nevertheless, if sales tax 
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legislature continues to vote to devote those revenues to DEPCO, there is no reason why the 
current solution cannot succeed in extinguishing the remaining deficit over a long period, 
which would tend to validate the political authorities' choice of that solution. 
The virtual disappearance of state-chartered private deposit insurance funds tends to 
support some general inferences regarding private deposit insurance, cross-guarantee 
arrangements, private clearinghouses, and the like, but also provides far less support than 
might be imagined for other general inferences.  Foremost among those supported is that great 
care must be taken in any private deposit insurance fund or analogous arrangement to prevent 
the largest institutions from exercising undue influence over examinations, accounting matters, 
premium adjustments for risk, and the timing and basis of appointment of receivers and 
conservators.  Steps to ensure the independence of a majority of the insurance fund's directors 
would help to prevent such undue influence.  But it probably is too strong an inference to 
conclude from the Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island examples that private deposit insurance 
cannot work anywhere:  It can and should work properly if  the structural independence of the 
governing board of the insurance fund deprives the most politically influential institutions of 
the fruits of their influence in the matters mentioned above. 
However, as in Rhode Island, the existence of any kind of federal safety net (in that 
case, a federal loan guarantee; in cross-guarantee plans, the availability of federal deposit 
insurance as a backup) tends to create a moral hazard problem for state and private insurance 
fund officials:  Why should they become more effective in assessing and responding to 
increased risk in their insured institutions if they know that a federal rescue of some sort is 
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more effective over time than the structural independence of its governing board would allow: 
If  the FDIC itself were subject to political pressure from either its largest insured institutions 
or government officials, then there is little reason to expect its performance over time to 
exceed that of Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island officials (see especially Kane [1992]). 
The resolution methods studied in these three states show that some methods are 
superior to others for specific purposes, but each state also experienced shortcomings in the 
resolution methods actually chosen.  In Ohio, the emergency closing of  all privately insured 
S&Ls forced state officials to deal with the crisis in a more comprehensive way and more 
rapidly than would likely have been the case if a regime of partial withdrawals had been 
pursued from the beginning.  Further, the Ohio solution was the cheapest of the three in terms 
of  the expenditure of state-controlled funds, and it caused a more rapid return to full 
availability of principal for nearly all depositors, with no direct federal assistance. 
In Maryland, the emergency restriction on withdrawals, combined with comparatively 
large Reserve Bank discount window support for liquidity advances, tended to stop the runs on 
both solvent and insolvent institutions and temporarily relieved state political officials of some 
of the sentiment of urgency that was present in Ohio.  However, those measures also burdened 
Maryland taxpayers with indirect responsibility for the eventual repayment of the Federal 
Reserve advances -- advances that, coming from a federal instrumentality, created the legal 
hurdle of a first lien that any state-crafted financial solution would have to overcome. 
In Rhode Island, the emergency closing of all RISDIC-insured institutions stopped the 
runs, but may have inadvertently created long delays for depositors in obtaining full access to 
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greater part of 1991, and doubts generated regarding the soundness of Rhode Island's state- 
supervised institutions contributed to a second series of runs in late January 1991 that 
weakened and forced the subsequent closing of a much larger institution, Old Stone Bank of 
Providence ($1.9 billion of total assets), a state-chartered savings bank insured by the FDIC.13 
Apart from Old Stone, the percentage of  losses in Rhode Island was so large (approaching one- 
third of  RISDIC-insured deposits) that a state-only solution appeared politically impractical, 
but with the defeasance last year of remaining DEPCO obligations for the federally guaranteed 
bonds, the state has in fact achieved an entirely state-funded solution. 
Finally, the Rhode Island experience does not suggest that state-supervised credit 
unions are more vulnerable to bad management, loan losses, poor investment decisions, or 
depositor runs than are other types of mutual savings associations.  With the exception of the 
largest RISDIC-insured credit unions, the percentage of  losses in Rhode Island was greatest at 
institutions that were not even credit unions--they were loan and investment banks or industrial 
banks. 
The real problem that any state supervisory authority or any private deposit insurance 
fund's supervisory board must confront is its capacity to supervise the largest depository 
institutions effectively and to retain sufficient political independence to be able to take strict 
enforcement actions against their imprudent banking practices.  If  a sufficient degree of 
supervisory capacity and political independence cannot be obtained, then it probably would be 
a good idea for such states to tender supervision of  the relevant classes of depository 
institutions to the federal authorities and to stop chartering private deposit insurance funds. 
17 
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supervise privately insured institutions effectively but nevertheless withdrew from such 
supervision as a general practice.  Other states, such as Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island, 
clearly lacked the capacity to supervise privately insured depository institutions adequately and 
probably should have been discouraged from issuing new charters for such institutions. 
In general, the case for the preservation of the dual banking system, with depository 
institution charters issued and supervision conducted by state as well as federal authorities, is 
weakened only superficially by the examples selected from Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island. 
Once one understands the true nature of those deposit insurance crises, one sees that, at the 
relevant times, the federal deposit insurance system shared many of the same weaknesses 
(subsequently remedied somewhat by enactment of  the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of  1991) with the deposit insurance funds in those states.  If new banking 
powers initiated under state law, such as the underwriting and retail brokerage of life insurance 
or annuity contracts, become widespread, the story told here will not require federal 
supervision of those powers.  However, this story does indicate that states will have to monitor 
the exercise of those powers carefully if future federal supervision and further erosion of the 
dual banking system are to be avoided. 
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1.  RISDIC-insured institutions by charter type at closing: 
Credit unions  35 
Loan and investment companies  7 
Bank and trust companies  -  3 
Total  45 
2.  Resolutions: 
Institutions reopened with NCUA insurance  25 
Loan and investment companies becoming 
inactive  2 
Institutions liquidated in 1991  6 
Institutions acquired by other federally insured 
institutions during 1991-92  6 
Institutions that are still self-liquidating under court 
supervision  1 
Cases remaining with DEPCO-funded liquidation  -  5 
Total  45 
3. DEPCO financial statements as of 6130193: 
Liabilities 
Assets 
Remaining fund deficit 
$ 698.8 million 
395.9 million 
$  302.9 million 
4.  Principal sources of DEPCO funds (amounts outstanding as of 6130193): 
DEPCO bonds payable from specifically 
assigned funds: 
Series A (1991)  $  31.6 million 
Series A (1992)  304.8 million 
Series B (1992)  133.4 million 
Total Series A & B  $ 469.8 million 
DEPCO bonds payable from its general 
funds: 
Series A (senior secured)  $  52.8 million 
Series B (subordinated & unsecured)  55.9 million 
Total general obligation bonds  $108.7 million 
Gross total of all bonds outstanding  $57  8.5 million 
Reserves and sinking funds for bond 
issues (restricted assets)  ($102.6 million) 
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as of 6130193: 
Guaranteed deposit liabilities 
Due to receiverships for deposits 
Total remaining guaranteed deposits 
6.  Total DEPCO primary liabilities (bonds plus deposit 
guarantees): 
Total of items 4 and 5 
7. Total DEPCO liquidity reserves in the form of cash 
or cash equivalents as of 6130193: 
Cash and cash equivalents available for 
reserves against deposits 
Restricted assets (see item 4) 
Total 
8. Total of DEPCO primary liabilities less primary cash 
reserves: 
Item 6 less item 7 
$ 57.7 million 
10.3 million 
$ 68.0 million 
$ 646.5 million 
$  19.6 million 
102.6 million 
$122.2 million 
$  524.3 million 
9. Liquidating assets available to finance bond, deposit guarantee, 
and other liabilities as of 6130193: 
At book value (net of valuation reserves)  $  254.2 million 
Of which loans and real estate owned (net of 
valuation reserves of at least $1 69.9 million)  $  203.9 million 
And of which due from receiverships and said to 
include environmentally tainted properties 
Cash  $  6.2 million 
Loans  3  1.1 million 
Real estate owned  1  1.0 million 
Other assets  0.6 million 
Total  $  48.9 million 
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Environmentally tainted receivership assets at a 30% 
discount from current book value (loans plus real 
estate owned, from item 9)  ($  12.6 million) 
Liquidation value of loans and real estate owned by 
DEPCO at 20% discount from current book value 
(from item 9)  ($  40.8 million) 
Total proposed adjustments  ($  53.4 million) 
11. Restatements of DEPCO fund deficit as of 6130193: 
DEPCO's statement, at book value  $  302.9 million 
Pulkkinen and Rosengren estimate (January 1993)  $  389.0 million 
DEPCO's statement, adjusted for item 10  $  356.3 million 
NOTE:  Special state sales tax proceeds devoted to DEPCO bond 
service yielded fiscal year 1993 collections of $38.1 million, and $3  1.9 
million was spent during that fiscal year for bond defeasance, primarily 
the defeasance of the federally guaranteed bond issue. 
SOURCES:  DEPCO (1993) and Pulkkinen and Rosengren (1993). 
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1.  See generally Federal Reserve Bank of  Cleveland (1985), Preston (1986), Gregorian 
(1991), and Todd (1994).  Credit unions and, prior to 1980, S&Ls typically offered share 
accounts, a legal concept analogous to but distinct from deposit accounts.  In an uninsured 
mutual savings association, the holders of  share accounts are, literally, the owners of  the 
association and share in its profits and losses to the extent that they exceed regulatory net- 
worth minimums. 
2.  See Kane (1985;  1989; 1992) for background  materials on  the collapse of  thrift 
industry  deposit  insurance  funds  in  the  1980s.  The  role  of  improper  accounting 
methodology in enabling the industry's problems to intensify is addressed specifically in 
Thomson (1992). 
3.  One of the principal problems with the institutional structure of  RISDIC identified in 
the  1991 investigative report  to  Rhode Island  Governor Bruce  Sundlun was  a  high 
concentration of insured deposits in large undercapitalized credit unions.  For example, the 
three largest institutions held  about 45 percent of  all RISDIC-insured deposits (about 
$800 million of  the $1.8 billion total as of  September 30, 1990) (Gregorian [1991]).  See 
also Syron (1991). 
4.  It appears that the particular treatment of  contingent losses reported by  RISDIC's 
outside  auditor,  1982-88,  was  permissible  under  Generally  Accepted  Accounting 
Principles at those times and enabled the auditor to give unqualified or clean opinions, but 
the auditor had to believe that it was unlikely any large member of RISDIC would fail to 
justify  that  opinion.  See Gregorian  (1991).  Rhode Island  authorities have  sued  the 
auditor, but the matter is still unresolved (McCarthy [1994]). 
5.  In fairness to those officials, it must be said that they may have been unaware of  the 
probable  consequences  of  their  legislative  actions  for  the  Rhode Island  credit union 
industry and  that they may  have intended no  harm.  However, in early  1986, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston officials gave explicit warnings to the then-governor and his staff 
regarding  the  likely  outcome  of  failure to  require federal insurance  for  all  RISDIC 
members (Syron [1991]). 
6.  See Pulldcinen and Rosengren (1993). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm7.  See  generally  U.S.  House  of  Representatives (1985),  Federal  Reserve Bank  of 
Cleveland (1985), Preston (1986), Gregorian (1991), and Syron (1991). 
8.  Authorities are divided as to whether  "rational" bank runs  (i.e.,  those  based  on 
accurate information or reasonable suspicion) should be tolerated or even encouraged in 
order to force politicians and regulators to take necessary corrective actions (see Kane 
119921  and  Kaufman  119881)  or,  rather,  should  be  discouraged  lest  such  runs 
communicate "systemic risk" to other, sound institutions (see, for example, Syron [1994]). 
All  authorities are in general agreement that "irrational" bank runs (i.e.,  those based on 
inaccurate information regarding the solvency of particular institutions or insurance funds) 
should be resisted. 
9.  See U.S.  House of Representatives (1985) and Preston (1986) regarding Ohio and 
Maryland.  Large insured institutions in these  states engaged in  collateralized reverse 
repurchase transactions covering U.S.  government securities with securities dealers that 
required excess collateral from the S&Ls that were borrowing  funds.  Meanwhile, the 
securities dealers' collateral custody arrangements were deficient:  They  used  custody 
receipts for the same collateral to cover multiple pledges.  Safe collateral procedures are 
distinguished from those used in the Ohio and Maryland cases in Stevens (1987). 
10.  See Kane and  Hendershott (1992) and Moysich  (1990) for important and  useful 
studies of  the  risk  characteristics that  distinguish credit  unions  from  other  types  of 
depository institutions. 
1  1.  See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of  199  1, section 43  1. 
In the May 24,  1991 field hearing  of  the House Banking, Finance, and  Urban  Affairs 
Committee,  Rhode  Island  Governor  Sundlun  noted  that  the  state's  congressional 
delegation had two requests before Congress for a $150 million outright grant and a $150 
million low-interest loan to DEPCO.  Governor Sundlun made a third proposal, the one 
actually enacted, to have Congress provide a federal loan guarantee for a DEPCO bond 
issue in an amount between $150 million and $210 million.  The amount approved was 
$180 million (U.S. House of Representatives 119911). 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm12.  The average (arithmetic mean) RISDIC-insured account was less than $6,000, but 
the  mean  is skewed  upward  by  the comparatively small number  of  high-dollar-value 
accounts. The median account value probably was somewhat less than $6,000. 
13.  Old  Stone was gravely weakened  by  the January  1991 runs, losing $130  million 
during  1991  and  $29  million  during  the  first  nine  months  of  1992.  The  bank 
unsuccessfully sought a purchaser or better-capitalized merger partner for most of  1991 
and 1992. When its tangible net worth ratio declined to 1.2 percent by January 1993, Old 
Stone was placed into receivership.  Its depositors were not delayed in gaining access to 
their funds at that time because their accounts were covered by  federal deposit insurance. 
In July  1994, Royal Bank of  Scotland purchased Old  Stone from the Resolution Trust 
Corporation  through  its  principal  U.S.  subsidiary,  the  Citizens  Financial  Group  of 
Providence, Rhode Island.  Royal paid a premium of $134 million and received $1.1 billion 
of deposits and $450 million of selected loans (Smith [1994]; Vogelstein [1993]). 
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